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Abstract
This paper provides a comprehensive econometric framework for the em-
pirical analysis of countervailing power. It encompasses the two main features
of pricing schemes in business-to-business relationships: nonlinear price sched-
ules and bargaining over rents. Disentangling them is critical to the empirical
identication of countervailing power. Testable predictions from the theoret-
ical analysis for a pragmatic reduced form empirical pricing model are delin-
eated. This model is readily implementable on the basis of transaction data,
routinely collected by antitrust authorities and illustrated using data from the
UK brick industry. The paper emphasizes the importance of controlling for
endogeneity of volumes and established supply chains and for heterogeneity
across buyers and sellers due to intrinsically unobservable outside options.
JEL Classication: D43, L11, L12, L14, L42, C23, C78
Keywords: countervailing power, bargaining, nonlinear prices, transac-
tion panel data
I am grateful for helpful discussions with Ron Smith, Sandeep Kapur and Kate Collyer. I
also benetted from comments by Richard Blundell, Hiroshi Ohashi, John Thanassoulis, Howard
Smith and Mike Whinston, seminar audiences at Cambridge, the IFS, ESMT, HKUST, UEA, and
anonymous referees. I am indebted to executives of the UK brick industry for letting me use their
data. The views expressed in this paper are the sole responsibility of the author. All errors are
mine.
Correspondence: w.beckert@bbk.ac.uk, Walter Beckert, School of Economics, Mathematics and
Statistics, Birkbeck College, University of London, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX, UK.
1
1 Introduction
Countervailing power, often referred to as buyer power, is a paramount con-
cern in competition analysis. It is a line of inquiry in many competition
investigations focussing on business-to-business (B2B) dealings. Quintessen-
tial high prole examples are the relationships between supermarkets and
their suppliers.1 Another recent topical example is the relationship between
Chinese steel mills and Australian and Brazilian iron ore miners.2
At the center of many competition inquiries are often generic products,
such as raw materials or bulk items. Then, the focus is on per unit prices,
usually obtained by antitrust bodies as revenue per unit sold. This price
measure typically constitutes a combination of the respective portion of a
nonlinear unit price schedule and a lump sum payment, e.g. a franchise fee,
rebate, retrospective quantity discounts or other incentive payment that is the
outcome of bargaining over joint surplus between buyer and supplier. Hence,
one of the primary diculties in the analysis of buyer power on the basis
of unit prices is the important distinction between nonlinear pricing and the
appropriation of rents by means of bargaining.3
The conceptual contribution of this paper is a framework that connects
the analysis of countervailing power4 with the design of optimal nonlinear
pricing schemes, while at the same time incorporating bargaining over rents.
It thereby illuminates how buyer power is enhanced by the buyer's ability to
1On the European level, the European Commission considered buyer power issues in the German
- Austrian merger Rewe/Meinl (1999) and the French - Spanish merger Carrefour/Promodes (2000);
see also European Commission (1999). On the national level, see, for example, the recent market
inquiry into UK grocery retailing by the UK Competition Commission, in particular Provisional
Findings Appendix 8; the report can be downloaded from the Competition Commission website.
2See Financial Times UK online, 09 July 2008. In spite of shipping costs per tonne from Brazil
being twice those from Australia, Brazilian and Australian miners receive the same freight-on-
board price. This is interpreted as a reection of superior negotiating power of Brazilian miners
when bargaining with Chinese mills, given the size of Chinese demand for, and the limitations on
Australian miners' capacity in the supply of, iron ore.
3See also Bonnet et al. (2010 ) who investigate manufacturer-retailer relationships involving
nonlinear pricing. They present empirical tests of two-part taris with versus without retail price
maintenance embedded in a structural model of competition in dierentiated product markets (e.g.
Berry (1994), Berry et al. (1995)) using market level data.
4The notion of countervailing (buyer) power was coined by Galbraith (1952) and theoretically
developed in a dynamic setting by Snyder (1996); see also infra note 10.
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switch between suppliers, and is constrained by the suppliers' outside options
and capacity; in particular, one novel insight that emerges from the theoretical
model and contrasts this paper with Chipty and Snyder (1999), Inderst and
Wey (2007), Smith and Thanassoulis (2008) and some conventional wisdom,
is that, in the face of suppliers' capacity constraints, buyer size may dimin-
ish buyer power. The theoretical model also oers supplier heterogeneity,
arising from idiosyncratic outside options, as a new explanation of equilib-
rium price dispersion; this line of argument is particularly pertinent to the
business-to-business context where traditional explanations in terms of im-
perfect information are implausible.5
The methodological contribution of the paper is a reduced form empiri-
cal approach that allows to test predictions deduced from the aforementioned
theoretical framework. It permits to reject, or establish evidence consistent
with, testable predictions from a model that embeds countervailing power in
bilateral bargaining, heterogeneity across buyers and sellers, as well as en-
dogenous nonlinear prices and quantities. These predictions include standard
predictions of endogenous quantities6, next to the more novel feature that the
number of a buyer's transaction partners is endogenous too, because it is an
equilibrium choice of the buyer. Furthermore, the theoretical model stipu-
lates nonlinear equilibrium price schedules that reect quantity discounts and
that are uniformly lower for buyers with more (and sellers with fewer) outside
options. And the model re-enforces the view that it is advantageous to have
panel data for an analysis of bilateral bargaining: To the extent that outside
options are often unobserved in the data or indeed intrinsically unobservable,
the fact that they act as shifters to the equilibrium price schedule amounts to
unobserved heterogeneity reected in bilateral bargaining outcomes. The em-
pirical approach advocated in this paper is easy to implement and hence does
not suer from the typical barriers to diusion into applied competition anal-
ysis that many fully structural models and associated empirical methodologies
5The traditional view relates to consumer retail prices and is articulated in Salop and Stiglitz
(1977, 1982), Reinganum (1979), Burdett and Judd (1983), Carlson and McAfee (1983), Hallagan
and Joerding (1985), Sorensen (2000) and the ensuing literature on equilibrium price dispersion.
6Cf. hedonic pricing literature, e.g. Ekeland et al. (2004); in the presence of nonlinear pricing,
the endogeneity of volume has the additional interpretation as arising from selection into parts of
a nonlinear tari.
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propagated in the industrial organization literature7 are fraught with.
The proposed methodology is illustrated using data from a UK Competi-
tion Commission merger inquiry in the brick manufacturing industry. While
it is a unique dataset for academic research, it is the kind of data competition
authorities typically have powers to request. It comprises all transactions be-
tween the main UK brick manufacturers and their customers over the period
2001-2006 and details, next to prices paid and quantities delivered, character-
istics of the respective buyer and brick type, manufacturing plant and delivery
locations as well as some cost and logistic information. Variation of actual
(and potential) transactional relationships over time and across locations in
these data permits identication of unobserved heterogeneity across buyers
and manufacturers. And it allows to delineate the impact of buyers' choice
options on prices obtained as bargaining outcomes, alongside the eects of
transaction and business size on prices paid.
The paper proceeds as follows. After a brief review of the relevant antitrust
background, section 2 outlines the theoretical model that guides the analysis;
the section concludes with the main issues that an econometric analysis of
countervailing power has to confront and delineates testable predictions that
the theory imposes on reduced form approaches to estimate models for prices
as bargaining outcomes. Section 3 is devoted to the empirical part of the
paper. It presents the background for, and data used in, the applied part of
the paper, and it summarizes the empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes.
1.1 Countervailing Power Analysis in Antitrust
The analysis of buyer power is often an integral part in antitrust inquiries.
The UK Competition Merger Guidelines (2003, revised 2010) consider buyer
power in merger assessment: Do buyers, either because of their size or com-
mercial signicance to their suppliers, have the ability to prevent the exercise
of market power by suppliers? This ability, if present, is akin to Galbraith'
(1952) notion of countervailing buyer power. The Competition Commission
considers such countervailing power as one potential mitigating factor, next
to others such as entry and switching costs, in the assessment of upstream
mergers. In the competition assessment in its market investigations (Com-
7Cf. Reiss and Wolak (2007).
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petition Commission Market Investigation Guidelines (2003)), it investigates
the \relative importance [to each other] of [each rm's] business with the
other party"8; there is an additional question whether any price reductions,
obtained by virtue of buyer power, are passed on to consumers. The guide-
lines enumerate several factors that are viewed as potentially aecting buyers'
ability to constrain suppliers: buyers' ability to nd alternative suppliers; the
ease with which buyers can switch suppliers; the extent to which buyers can
credibly threaten to set up their own supply arrangements, e.g. by backward
integration or by sponsoring entry; the extent to which buyers can impose
costs on suppliers, e.g. by delaying or stopping purchases or by transferring
risk. It is worth noting in this regard that a buyer's size can cut both ways:
while size enhances the signicance of the buyer's business vis-a-vis the sup-
plier, it makes switching more dicult when alternative suppliers' capacities
are constrained.
A prototypical conventional buyer power analysis is the Competition Com-
mission's investigation as part of its inquiry into grocery retailing in the UK
(2008). Based on their size, pricing and margins, the Commission concluded
that all large retailers, wholesalers and buying groups have buyer power vis-
a-vis their suppliers. However, the Commission considered that their buyer
power is oset by market power of suppliers of branded goods; and that lower
prices arising from buyer power in part are passed on to consumers. The
Commission substantiated these ndings with an analysis of panel data, which
for various stock-keeping-units (SKUs) comprised yearly prices, volumes and
some cost information. The Commission's methodology consisted of xed-
eects regressions of unit prices on volumes.9
The Commission's analysis raises several questions. Panel data meth-
ods can capture unobserved heterogeneity. The analysis modelled SKU-level
idiosyncratic eects, but is this the appropriate level of heterogeneity? More-
over, does aggregation to annual data mask latent heterogeneity across time?
The analysis may also raise concerns about the treatment of volumes: If
business-to-business relationships involve bargaining over both volumes and
prices, then volumes should be treated as endogenous regressors. Furthermore,
8Competition Commission Guidlines (2003) for market investigation references, paragraph 3.37.
9Details can be found in the Competition Commission's Final Report of the Grocery Market
Investigation (2008), Appendix 5.3.
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the caveat about the ambiguous volume eect notwithstanding, the Commis-
sion's analysis focussed on volume eects on prices as evidence of buyer power,
without attempting to quantify buyer's ability to switch suppliers. But vol-
ume eects on unit prices might just reect suppliers' nonlinear pricing and
self-selection of buyers into the appropriate part of the tari, irrespective of
buyer power. Hence, this type of reduced form analysis might be critiqued
along various dimensions, and it highlights that the treatment of potential
heterogeneity across buyers and suppliers, endogeneity of prices and volumes
and the distinction between nonlinear pricing and bargaining over rents are
the primary empirical challenges of the empirical analysis of buyer power.
1.2 Related Literature
Its growing importance and policy relevance notwithstanding, the academic
literature on buyer power is still relatively sparse. Inderst and Mazzarotto
(2006) survey its main theoretical strands to date, as they relate to sources
and consequences of, as well as policy responses to, buyer power of retailers
vis-a-vis manufacturers10. The theoretical model in this paper oers a new
theoretical perspective on the analysis of buyer power, casting the design
of optimal nonlinear price schedules within the framework of co-operative
bilateral bargaining, building on the general propositions in Stole and Zwiebel
(1996).
With regard to applied work, the academic literature oers very little to-
wards a comprehensive empirical framework for the analysis of buyer power
that connects theory with data and estimation strategy.11 Giulietti (2007)
10Inderst and Shaer (2006), for example, consider the eect of retail mergers on product variety.
The aforementioned paper by Snyder (1996) provides an explanation for discounts granted to
large buyers. His analysis translates ideas in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) into the context
of an innitely repeated game with upstream competition vis-a-vis a single downstream buyer;
there, buyer size makes a seller's deviation, in the form of discounts, from upstream collusion
protable relative to possible punishment. Recent theoretical work by Smith and Thanassoulis
(2008) demonstrates how upstream competition can endow large buyers with market power by
inducing supplier-level volume uncertainty.
11There is some early nonstructural work that provides empirical evidence supporting counter-
vailing buyer power; see Adelman (1959), Brooks (1973), Buzzell et al. (1975), Lustgarten (1975),
McGukin and Chen (1976), McKie (1950), Clevenger and Campbell (1977), Boulding and Staelin
(1990). Dobson and Waterson (1997) and von Ungern-Sternberg (1996) examine the eect on
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presents a reduced form analysis of the Italian grocery retail sector, approx-
imating suppliers' bargaining power by a concentration measure for the re-
spective product level industry they operate in. The empirical analysis of this
paper uses data that allow for a more detailed measure of local competition,
which is especially important in industries like bricks or aggregates where
transport costs are signicant. Chipty and Snyder's (1999) approach exhibits
more detailed structural features. It provides an empirically testable condi-
tion - concavity of the supplier's revenue function - that needs to be satised
for larger buyers, e.g. arising from buyer mergers, to obtain lower transfer
prices when bargaining over surplus with their suppliers. This framework
captures the anecdotal view that larger buyers enjoy greater buyer power. It
is useful when the analysis focuses on revenues for bespoke goods or services;
this is the case in Chipty and Synder's application of their model to the US
cable television industry. It is less suited for the typical generic goods and
commodities encountered in many antitrust investigations and illustrated in
the application to the brick industry presented in this paper.
While Chipty and Snyder consider the case of an upstream monopoly, El-
lison and Snyder (2001) build on this approach and investigate the role of
substitution possibilities as a consequence of upstream competition. They
focus on price dierences in wholesale pharmaceutical markets between dif-
ferent types of buyers, controlling for various institutional dierences with
regard to drug administration.12 Using cross-section data, their analysis can-
not model unobserved heterogeneity across buyers. The empirical analysis
presented in this paper demonstrates that there exist circumstances in which
the conclusion about buyer power critically hinges on accounting for unob-
served heterogeneity.
Related work by Villas-Boas (2007) examines vertical relationships be-
tween manufacturers and retailers with limited data, when wholesale prices
for transactions between them are not observed; her objective is to indirectly
identify the strategic model appropriate for their interaction from demand
countervailing power on consumer prices.
12Drugs can be branded and subject to patent protection, branded and subject to generic com-
petitors, or generic and subject to some form of oligopolistic competition. Buyers such as HMOs
and hospitals have wider substitution possibilities through the use of restrictive formularies relative
to chain drugstores and independent drugstores. Ellison and Snyder (2001) empirically examine
the eects of dierent features of drugs on the dierence in prices paid by various types of buyers.
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and cost estimates, with a particular focus on pricing models which feature
double marginalization. Her approach is insightful when researchers have to
contend themselves with less detailed data than the ones used in this paper
and those that antitrust authorities are typically in a position to request from
the parties under investigation.
2 Theory
As a preamble to the theoretical section of the paper, it is worth emphasizing
at the outset that the theoretical framework outlined below is a stylized char-
acterization of generic business-to-business bargaining and not intended to
capture all the intricacies of business-to-business relationships. Instead, it is
intended to motivate the main issues that econometric analyses of countervail-
ing power have to deal with. The empirical strategy proposed in this paper
deliberately follows a reduced form econometric approach that is informed
by the structural model, but does not suer from the typical potential crit-
icism of strong identifying restrictions that structural approaches rely upon.
The econometric approach proposed here instead relies on testable implica-
tions stipulated by theory that are robust across more tightly specied, fully
structural models.
The following subsection starts out with the simplest version of a model
of bilateral B2B bargaining. It subsequently expands and generalizes this
model in various directions, in order to illuminate how dierent modeling as-
sumptions - about upstream competition, bargaining weights, outside options
- aect the equilibrium bargaining outcomes. This subsection is followed by
a discussion of testable restrictions that the theoretical considerations impose
on reduced-form econometric models for unit prices of the type often encoun-
tered in antitrust investigations.
2.1 Multilateral Bargaining
To start, consider bilateral bargaining with complete information between a
single buyer and suppliers of an input to the buyer's production technology.
Consider the following assumptions:
A1: The buyer's production technology uses input q which induces revenue
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function F (q) = q,  2 (0; 1) and  > 0.
A2: The buyer faces a supplier whose payment schedule for the delivery of
q is given by C(q) = q, ;   0. The supplier incurs zero cost of
production.
A3: The buyer maximizes prots F (q) C(q); Nash bargaining over the joint
surplus between buyer and supplier, with equal bargaining weights13, in-
duces the optimal price schedule that the supplier presents to the buyer.
Proposition 1: Under assumptions A1-A3, the optimal nonlinear price
schedule is p(q) = q2 1.
Proof: Bargaining over surplus is the rst stage of a two-stage game be-
tween the buyer and the supplier. On the second stage, given a price schedule
p(q) and associated payment schedule C(q) = p(q)q, the buyer chooses the
prot maximizing amount of inputs. This two-stage game is solved by back-
wards induction.
Maximizing the buyer's prots (q;; ) = F (q) C(q) = q q over q
on the second stage yields optimal inputs q =



 1
 
. The associated maxi-
mum prot is q q =



 
  



 
 
=

1

 
    

 
 
 

   1

>
0, provided  > .
Following Stole and Zwiebel (1996), Nash bargaining on the rst stage
induces the supplier to design the payment schedule such that the loss from
a breakdown in negotiations for both parties equate, i.e. the supplier chooses
 >  and  > 0 that
(q; ; ) =



 
 
  



 
 
= 



 
 
:
This implies that  = 2, while  is indeterminate, so without loss of gen-
erality  = 114. This implies the optimal price schedule p(q) = C(q)=q =
q=q = q2 1, and the buyer's and supplier's prots are
 


 
  = 
2
4 . 
A few comments may be useful to interpret this result. The revenue func-
tion F (q) = q is a surrogate of the buyer's technology to convert input q
13This assumption is for ease of exposition and further discussed below. Some recent structural
empirical analyses of negotiated prices in specic industries nd evidence to the contrary; cf.
Crawford and Yurukoglu (2009), Draganska et al. (2009), and Grennan (2009).
14This can be viewed as a normalization; only the demand scale  and the bargaining weights
matter for the equilibrium outcomes; see also Corollary 1 below.
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into a nal product sold in a downstream market and of the buyer's competi-
tive position in that downstream market which this analysis remains agnostic
about. The more ecient the buyer's technology to generate revenue from
using input q, i.e. the higher , the higher the equilibrium unit price schedule
that the supplier presents to the buyer. The parameter  can be viewed as
a measure of demand for the buyer's nal product sold in the downstream
market. High demand downstream induces high anticipated input demand
q =



 1
 
and high prots for the buyer, but these higher prots are also
shared by the supplier as a result of bargaining over the joint surplus. Note
also that the equilibrium price schedule is deduced from anticipated demands
q, while the equilibrium input level demanded on the basis of the equilibrium
price schedule is
 

2
 1
 ; of course, anticipated and realized demand are corre-
lated, through the demand parameter  . This feature of the model is often
borne out in applications where so-called framework agreements or list prices,
oered on the basis of anticipated demand prospects, provide an indicative
price schedule subject to which deliveries subsequently can be called o, next
to one-o purchases at ad hoc negotiated or 'spot' prices.
The assumption of equal split in Nash bargaining may be plausible in
the case of a bilateral monopoly, but less so in cases where parties negotiate
bilaterally, but have dierential outside options; e.g. the supplier may be able
to export his product15 and hence has less to lose in the event of a breakdown
of negotiations. Proposition 1 has the following Corollary that captures the
case of dierent bargaining weights.
Corollary 1: Suppose A1 and A2 hold, the buyer maximizes F (q) C(q),
buyer and seller Nash bargain over the joint surplus, with the buyer's loss from
a breakdown of bargaining being a multiple  > 1 of the seller's loss. Then,
p(q) = q(1+) 1.
The proof follows the same steps as the one of Proposition 1. The result
shows that the less the seller has to lose relative to the buyer when negotiations
break down, i.e. the larger , the less generous the equilibrium price schedule
the seller oers to the buyer.
Now consider an extension of this model that allows for upstream com-
petition among several suppliers for the buyer's business. Suppose the buyer
faces two identical suppliers, i.e. there is upstream competition and the buyer
15See also supra footnote 13.
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bargains multilaterally; for simplicity, the following result reverts to the case
with equal bargaining weights, while the subsequent results relaxes this as-
sumption. The buyer will nd it optimal to source from both suppliers if
the optimal equilibrium payment schedule is convex, i.e.  > 1. Therefore,
consider the assumptions
A1': The buyer's production technology uses input q and induces the revenue
function F (q) = q,  2  12 ; 1.
A2': The buyer faces two identical suppliers whose payment schedule for the
delivery of q is given by C(q) = q,   0;  > 1. The suppliers incur
zero cost of production.
A3': The buyer maximizes prots; Nash bargaining over the joint surplus
between buyer and suppliers holding passive beliefs16 induces the optimal
price schedule that the supplier presents to the buyer.
Proposition 2: Under assumptions A1', A2' and A3', upstream competi-
tion induces an optimal nonlinear price schedule ~p(q) that involves ~p(q) < p(q)
for all q > 0, where p(q) is given by Proposition 1.
Proof: Since the marginal contribution to the buyer's revenue from either
supplier is the same at an optimal input allocation, it must be that, with
convex payments, the buyer sources the same amount from both. Hence, on
the second stage, the buyer maximizes (2q)   2q over q. This yields
optimal input demands ~q = 2
 1
 



 1
 
= 2
 1
  q < q and 2~q = 2
 1
  q > q.
This implies associated maximum prots of (~q;; ) = 2
( 1)
  (q;; ).
Consider the Nash bargaining stage where the buyer faces a supplier, hold-
ing passive beliefs. The supplier designs a price schedule with parameters ~
and ~ such as to equate the loss to the buyer from breakdown with the sup-
plier's loss of revenue, i.e.
2
( 1)
  (q; ~; ~)  
2
4
= ~


~~
 ~
~ 
2
~( 1)
~  :
16Cf. McAfee and Schwartz (1994); this assumption is maintained in Stole and Zwiebel (1996)
and, more generally, the literature on bargaining with multiple agents. It stipulates in this context
that in any bilateral bargaining situation between a buyer and a supplier, the parties hold the
belief that, should bargaining between them break down, the buyer reaches an ecient bargaining
outcome with the other supplier.
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Suppose the supplier were to choose ~ = 2 and ~ = 1, as in Proposition 1, i.e.
as if there were no upstream competition. Then, the buyer's lost prots (the
LHS of the preceding equality) would be 
2
4
 
22 1   1 > 0 if  > 12 , while the
supplier's lost prots (the RHS of the preceding equality) would be 
2
4 2
2( 1).
Hence, the supplier has more to lose from a breakdown in bargaining than the
buyer and, therefore, has an incentive to oer better terms17, i.e. ~ <  and
~  . 
Proposition 2 shows that upstream competition endows the buyer with
countervailing power vis-a-vis suppliers that permits to extract uniformly
more favorable terms from them. It follows as a corollary that the buyer's
prots are increased by upstream competition. This inspires the denition of
countervailing buyer power in terms of equilibrium prices:
Denition: Consider a buyer who faces a nonlinear equilibrium price
schedule pi(q), q > 0, in the presence of an upstream monopoly of supplier
i. The buyer enjoys countervailing power if, in equilibrium, the supplier i
present the buyer with a nonlinear price schedule ~pi(q) < pi(q) for all q > 0.
Considering the equilibrium pay-o structure resulting from Proposition
2, by construction the pay-os are balanced and ecient. Moreover, they
are individually fair, i.e. they exceed the individual non-cooperation pay os;
symmetric, i.e. the equivalent suppliers receive the same pay-os; additive
across bargains; and satisfy that a supplier who does not contribute to the joint
surplus receives a zero pay-o. The revenue or prot accruing to the supplier
therefore has the interpretation of the supplier's Shapley value associated
with the cooperative game between the buyer and the two suppliers.18 Since
~q < q, it follows that ~p(~q)~q < p(q)q. This inspires an equivalent denition of
countervailing buyer power in terms of Shapley values:
Denition: Consider supplier i's Shapley value in the cooperative game
associated with the coalition including only i and the buyer, pi(qi)qi. The
buyer enjoys countervailing power if i's Shapley value in the cooperative game
associated with the coalition including, inter alia, supplier i and the buyer,
~pi(~qi)~qi, satises ~pi(~qi)~qi < pi(qi)qi.
17This can also be formally shown by noting that the derivative of the buyer's loss with respect
to  and  at  and  is negative and dominated by the derivative of the supplier's loss with
respect to the payment parameters at that point, so that the values ~ and ~ cannot be larger than
 and .
18See Myerson (1980), Hart and Mas Colell (1989), Stole and Zwiebel (1996).
12
A question that arises in the presence of upstream competition is whether
Bertrand style price competition would not drive prices below those predicted
by Proposition 2. While it is beyond the scope of this analysis to address
this concern in a more comprehensive framework, results due to Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983) suggest that, in industries where capacity is a strategic
variable, price competition subsequent to capacity choices yields Cournot com-
petition outcomes, with prices above marginal cost. In the kind of applications
that are envisaged for this theoretical investigation, capacity typically plays
an essential role, not least because it may well limit the extent to which the
buyer may be able to credibly threaten to divert demand away from a supplier.
Just as Corollary 1, it also follows as a corollary to the preceding proposi-
tion that any outside options the suppliers have, such as the selling to other
buyers, enhances their bargaining outcome, because such outside options re-
duce the loss they incur in the event of a breakdown of bargaining. To gen-
eralize this setup further, consider the case where the two suppliers are het-
erogeneous, e.g. due to dierent outside options19. Consider the following
variant of the previous assumptions,
A2": The buyer faces two heterogeneous suppliers whose payment schedules
for the delivery of q are given by C(q) = q,  > 1,  > 2, and
supplier i's outside option is given by (   i)q, i = f1; 2g, where
0 < 1 < 2 < 1.
A3": The buyer maximizes prots; Nash bargaining over the joint surplus
between buyer and suppliers holding passive beliefs induces the optimal
price schedule that the supplier presents to the buyer, where suppliers
optimize , taken  as given20
In this setup, supplier 1 has a more favorable outside option.
Proposition 3: Under assumption A1', A2" and A3", in an interior
equilibrium in which the buyer sources from both suppliers, assuming it exists,
19For example, this could be thought of as the buyer under consideration being located at the
midpoint of a Hotelling street connecting the two suppliers, and a second buyer being located on
the opposite side of the rst supplier, say. The distance between supplier 1 and the second buyer
is then shorter than between the second buyer and supplier 2.
20While this restricts the elasticity of the equilibrium payment schedules to be the same for
the heterogeneous suppliers, it allows for dierent levels in the schedules. This restriction is for
analytical convenience.
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the optimal nonlinear price schedule of supplier 1, p1(q), dominates the one
for supplier 2, p2(q), in the sense that p1(q) > p2(q) for all q > 0.
Remark: Lemma 1 in the Appendix establishes conditions under which a
dual-sourcing equilibrium exists.
Proof : For ease of exposition and to keep formulae as simple as possible,
and w.l.o.g., consider the case where  = 1. At the second stage, the buyer
maximizes (q1 + q2)
   1q1   2q2 . At the optimal input allocation (q1; q2),
the marginal contribution of the two suppliers to the buyer's revenue must be
the same, so that q2 = q1, where  =

2
1
 1
1 
. Hence, the buyer maximizes
(q1(1 + ))
   1q1   2(q1), which yields
q1 =
(1 + )

 
(1 + 2)
1
 



 1
 
;
and the buyer's prot is
(q1;1; 2) =
(1 + )

 
(1 + 2)

 
"


 
 
 



 
 
#
:
=
(1 + )

 
(1 + 2)

 



 
  

  1

:
Consider the Nash bargaining stage between the buyer and supplier 1,
assuming passive beliefs. If bargaining breaks down, then the buyer's prot
reached with supplier 2 is (q;; ) =



 
    



 
 
, as in Propo-
sition 1. Supplier 2's prot, beyond 2's outside option, is 2



 
 
.21
Hence, supplier 2 will design a price schedule such as to equate this excess
prot with (q;; ), choosing 2 =
 

   1
 1
1 2 > 1, i.e. ceteris paribus
the higher supplier 2's outside option (the lower 2), the less favorable the
terms oered to the buyer. The prot of the buyer under these terms is
(q;2) =
 


 
 
 

   1
 
(1 2)( ) . Hence, when bargaining with the buyer,
supplier 1 will equate the loss to the buyer in the event of a breakdown,
2(1; 2; 2) =
"
(1 + )

 
(1 + 2)

 


  1

 


  1
 
(1 2)( )
#


 
 
(1)
21This requires the implicit assumption that, once negotiations between the buyer and supplier
1 have broken down, the buyer will not re-start negotiations with supplier 1, so that supplier 2
eectively enjoys a monopoly position.
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with supplier 1's loss of revenue beyond the outside option,
s1(1; 2; 1) = 
1
1
(1 + )

 
(1 + 2)

 



 
 
:
This implicitly denes supplier 1's optimal design response to supplier 2,
b1(2; 1; 2), as the solution of
2(b1(2; 1; 2); 2; 2) = s1(b1(2; 1; 2); 2; 1):
Analogous considerations with regard to Nash bargaining between the buyer
and supplier 2 yield supplier 2's optimal design response to supplier 1, b2(1; 1; 2).
Suppose it were the case that ? = b1(
?; 1; 2) = b2(
?; 1; 2), so that
 = 1, while 1 < 2. Then,
1(
?; 1; 2) =
"
2
2?
 
  

  1

 


  1
 
(1 2)( )
#


 
 
2(
?; 1; 2) =
"
2
2?
 
  

  1

 


  1
 
(1 1)( )
#


 
 
s1(
?; 1; 2) = (
?)1



 
 

2
2
 
 
s2(
?; 1; 2) = (
?)2



 
 

2
2
 
 
and 1 < 2 then implies that
1(
?; 1; 2) > 2(
?; 1; 2)
s1(
?; 1; 2) > s2(
?; 1; 2):
This implies that, under equal terms ?, the buyer loses more when negotia-
tions with supplier 1 break down than when they break down with supplier
2, even though supplier 1 enjoys the more favorable outside option. This in
turn, implies that, in equilibrium, supplier 1 chooses uniformly less favorable
terms relative to those implied by ?, while supplier 2 ameliorates the terms
oered to the buyer relative to ?, so that p1(q) = 
?
1q
 > ?2q
 for all q > 0,
where
?1 = b1 (b2(
?
1 ; 1; 2); 1; 2)
?2 = b2(
?
1 ; 1; 2) < 
?
1 :
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Note that, in equilibrium, it must be that ?2 > 1, since otherwise supplier
2's outside option would be negative, implying a gain to the supplier from
breakdown of negotiations with the buyer. 
Proposition 3 has the noteworthy corollary that supplier 2 may well ben-
et from a very favorable outside option on the part of supplier 1, which
makes it easy for supplier 1 to walk away from negotiations with the buyer,
approximating the situation of a single supplier, as in Proposition 1. Since
?1 > 
?
2 and A1' and A2" imply  > 1, it follows that q
?
2 = 
?q?1, where
? =

?2
?1
 1
 1
> 1 so that q?2 > q
?
1, for q
?
1 =
(1+?)

 
(?1+
??2 )
1
 
 


 1
  . There-
fore, the higher supplier 1's outside option, the more aggressively he can aord
to price in equilibrium and, consequently, the more supplier 2 can sell and the
higher supplier 2's revenues. Suppliers' capacity constraints can naturally be
cast in this framework. A supplier operating at close to capacity does not
suer much from a breakdown in negotiations with the buyer. With complete
information, this allows a competing supplier to price aggressively, essentially
earning the shadow value of the rival's capacity constraint. The aforemen-
tioned example of equal freight-on-board iron ore prices paid by Chinese steel
mills to Australian and Brazilian miners illustrates this case22
Furthermore, the proposition shows that supplier heterogeneity can induce
dispersion of nonlinear equilibrium prices. This is dierent from the expla-
nation of (retail) price dispersion as a consequence of incomplete information
and search costs, and it is a plausible alternative explanation especially in
the business-to-business bargaining context where search costs are typically
small, at least relative to the size and value of the transaction.
The ensemble of Propositions 1 - 3 implies another remarkable corollary.
It shows that, if the buyer and a supplier operate in geographically dispersed
markets and meet in several dierent local markets which exhibit dierent
levels of upstream competition, then this induces dispersion of nonlinear equi-
librium prices across their transactions, in the sense that the same buyer pays
dierent prices for the same quantity in dierent local markets. This is illus-
trated in the empirical section of the paper.
22Se empirical auction literature identied similar issues; see e.g. Bajari (1997).
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2.2 Implications for Empirical Strategy
Consider a generic equilibrium price schedule in B2B bargaining between sup-
plier i and buyer j of the form pij(qij). The preceding sequence of results shows
that
ln(pij(q)) = ln(ij)  ij ln(q);
where ij and ij are parameters that capture the equilibrium bargaining
outcome of the two-step game between buyer and sellers. In particular, they
capture observed and unobserved heterogeneity across buyers and sellers due
to dierential outside options. An econometric version of this model for a
specic transaction t between i and j might be
ln(pijt) = ln(pijt(qijt)) = bij(xijt)  aij ln(qijt) + ijt;
where ln(ijt) is cast as a function bij dened over a vector xijt of character-
istics of the respective transactional relation between supplier i and buyer j;
next to product characteristics, these can include measures quantifying the
parties' outside options or switching possibilities. The function bij may incor-
porate transaction-independent, idiosyncratic buyer and seller eects to ac-
count for unobserved outside options. The residual term ijt captures further
transaction-dependent unobservables, such as unobserved product character-
istics or, possibly, temporal shocks to bargaining weights23. These may be
correlated with transaction volume qijt and endogenous components of xijt,
such as number of other established supply relationships.
The preceding theoretical results suggest the following properties of equi-
librium price schedules in B2B bargaining:
 Transaction volumes qijt may be an endogenous right-hand-side variable.
 In the presence of upstream market power, equilibrium prices are non-
linear, and aij captures the degree of nonlinearity.
 Upstream market power operates i.a. through the seller idiosyncratic
eect, say i, in bij , in the sense that enhanced outside options on the
part of supplier i induce uniformly higher equilibrium prices pij(q) for
all q.
23On the part of seller i, a positive ijt might arise from i operating close to capacity, so that
the relative loss from a breakdown of bargaining is low; similarly, a negative ijt might arise from
i might arise from i operating with idle capacity and temporary capacity shut-downs being costly.
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 Countervailing buyer power operates i.a. through the buyer idiosyncratic
eect, say j , in bij , in the sense that greater switching possibilities to
alternative suppliers reduce the equilibrium price schedule pij(q) uni-
formly for all q.
 Countervailing power eects operate also through observable measures
in xijt, such as number of established alternative supplier relationships
or supply chains for transaction t, and through aij .
 To the extent that i and j arise from information unobserved by the
econometrician, they constitute unobserved heterogeneity across buyers
and suppliers.
While in principle it is possible to estimate an unrestricted version of the
above econometric model, practitioners will often nd it more practical to
restrict aij to be a constant across i and j and to focus on estimates of i
and j as evidence of countervailing power
24. These considerations suggest
an econometric model for equilibrium prices in B2B bargaining of the form
pijt = b+ i + j + a  qijt + x0ijt + ijt:
This model can be estimated using transaction panel data, provided instru-
ments for the potentially endogenous regressor qijt and, if applicable, the num-
ber of established supply chains are available. It may be worth noting that,
in many applications, realized input demand qijt may be a derived demand,
owing from demand in the downstream market where the associated input
price is a small component of the nal good price. Then, if price is governed
by a framework agreement or list price, transaction volume can plausibly be
treated as exogenous. When the observed price does not result from a frame-
work agreement or is part of an ad hoc bargaining outcome, so that volume
ought to be treated as endogenous, buyer size may act as an instrument for
volume: It is correlated with transaction volume, but as in this case the econo-
metric relationship captures a one-o relationship for an ad hoc transaction,
buyer size is exogenous to the bargain. Instruments that naturally suggest
themselves for the number of established supplier relationships are data on
transaction logistics such as free delivery or transport arrangements, under
24There exist panel data estimators allowing for heterogeneous coecients, e.g. Swamy (1970).
The present restriction will not impede the consistency of the estimator, even if the aij actually
vary across i and j, but have the same conditional mean, given included regressors.
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the identifying assumption that there is no bundling. This is often valid when
suppliers oer free transport as a recognition of customer loyalty; in that case,
this is clearly a strategy designed to provide incentives to customers not to
switch, so it is correlated with established supply chains, but as a practically
gratuitous add-on it is uncorrelated with price.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Background and Data25
The data for the empirical part of this paper come from the UK brick in-
dustry. This sector has been the focus of a recent merger inquiry by the UK
competition authorities where the question of potential countervailing buyer
power was also investigated. Pre-merger, there are four main manufacturers
of bricks in the UK. The data are transaction-level data and comprise the
manufacturers' transactions with all their UK customers in the period 2001 -
2006. Customers are construction rms, or builders, and intermediaries, such
as builders' merchants and factors (merchants specializing on bricks).
Each of the four brick manufacturers is involved in all stages of the brick
manufacturing process. This process starts from extracting clay from the soil
and processing it, including shaping it, and eventually burning the bricks in
large furnaces or kilns. As transportation costs are signicant in this indus-
try, most manufacturing plants are close to clay deposits, and buyers favor
nearby manufacturing plants. Two main types of bricks emerge from these
processes: facing bricks, used as cladding material for the outside of buildings,
distinguishing the more expensive soft-mud brick from the more conventional
extruded variety; and engineering bricks, used to erect structures and accord-
ingly meeting special requirements with regard to load-bearing capacity and
water retention.
The industry has been experiencing some decline over the last decades.
Industry sources attribute this to reductions in the number of houses built,
the change in the housing mix from detached and semi-detached houses to
25The description of the industry background follows the UK Competition Commissions provi-
sional ndings report onWienerberger Finance Service BV / Baggeridge Brick plc (2007), Appendix
C. The report is available from the Competition Commission website.
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apartments, and dierent choices for structural and cladding materials, such
as timber, concrete blocks, steel and curtain walling (glass, laminates etc.).
With regard to the procurement of bricks, there are two primary channels.
One possibility is for buyers to purchase through framework agreements at
pre-determined prices. These agreements set out a matrix of prices and brick
specications, including brick type and transport costs to dierent locations.
Prices can be quoted as ex-works or delivered prices. Buyers can thereby
negotiate the terms of the agreement, including retrospective rebates, poten-
tially on the basis of historic and prospective volumes. Eventually, once a
framework is agreed upon, there is, however, no rm commitment on the part
of the buyer, who can call o supplies according to the needs as they arise.
Builders' merchants also use framework agreements, albeit typically with less
detailed specicity. Framework agreements are typically negotiated annually.
Alternatively, bricks can be purchased ad hoc at spot prices. Buyers may
still enjoy eventual retrospective rebates, and many buyers who sign frame-
work agreements may still buy ad hoc, e.g. when a manufacturer wishes to
sell o stock or a buyer experiences an unusual demand in terms of brick type,
location or volume. While the main manufacturers do have price lists, these
list prices do not apply to the bulk of bricks transactions.
The analysis presented here focuses on ex works prices per one thousand
bricks, i.e. net of transport costs, and also net of any rebates. Since the data
from one of the suppliers do not permit to separate transport costs from total
transaction price, this supplier's data have been excluded from most of the
analysis.
There are just below 7000 customers that purchased bricks from the four
manufacturers over the six year period 2001 - 2006. Table 2 provides a broad
summary of the degree of switching of customers, volume and revenue between
the three manufacturers included in the empirical analysis. It shows that there
is a fair amount of switching of these between the four suppliers; for example,
supplier 1 lost 6.1 percent of customers in 2002, relative to 2001. But often,
suppliers are able to make up the loss of customers by selling increased volume
to those customers who are retained, e.g. while supplier 1 lost 6.1 percent of
customers in 2002 relative to 2001, this supplier increased overall volume
by 4.6 percent over the same period; the same supplier was even able to
increase revenue in the face of customer and volume losses, going from 2005
20
to 2006 (revenue increase of 6.9 precent vis-a-vis a decline of customers by 4.5
percent and of volume by 2.9 percent, respectively), either by increasing prices
or selling more expensive product varieties. Hence, while Table 2 provides
evidence that buyers' switching to and from suppliers is a salient feature of the
UK brick industry and hence is consistent with necessary conditions for buyers
having countervailing power, such as availability of alternative suppliers and
relative ease of switching, the summary statistics reported in the table also
suggest that manufacturers' may have market power when setting prices.
Supplier 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06
Customers
Supplier 1 -6.1 1.7 1.5 -6.1 -4.5
Supplier 2 -11.9 9.9 -10.9 6.0 -10.0
Supplier 3 -20.8 2.17 7.5 08.6 0.5
Volume
Supplier 1 4.6 4.6 -1.7 0.4 -2.9
Supplier 2 -19.7 36.3 -5.6 13.6 -7.77
Supplier 3 0.1 3.0 1.0 -0.3 -7.9
Revenue
Supplier 1 8.4 11.3 4.4 0.6 6.95
Supplier 2 -17.9 41.6 -1.1 18.1 -03.0
Supplier 3 3.0 8.8 3.9 5.0 -0.2
Table 2: Switching, relative to base yearn, in percent.
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The data also provide an interesting illustration of price dispersion in the
absence of imperfect information. Figure 1 shows the price per 1000 bricks
paid by three national builders for a red multi brick26 for all deliveries to
their various construction sites in 200427. This brick is manufactured by one
of the four brick manufacturers, and each of this manufacturer's competitors
produces an essentially equivalent brick. It is straightforward for buyers to
enquire about the costs of such substitutes for this red multi brick, so imper-
fect information does not rationalize the price dispersion in the data. The
theoretical results above suggest that dierent local competitive conditions
around the delivery sites - in terms of number of actual or potential local
competitors and associated dierential bargaining weights on both sides of
the bargain - are consistent with this pattern of prices. The construction sites
are in areas with locally distinct numbers of competing manufacturers, induc-
ing dierential bargaining power on the side of local buyers. On the other
hand, the manufacturers may have dierent degrees of local bargaining power
due to dierential outside options, possibly as a consequence of their capacity
utilizations28 or the number and size of local construction projects. Since this
red multi brick is a standard and universally popular product, cost dierences
are an unlikely alternative explanation for this variation in prices29, as are
variations on the demand side such as taste dierences.
Note that it is not possible to discern nonlinear pricing from Figure 1,
even if it exists. Since the data unfortunately do not allow to identify which
transactions were governed by framework agreements and which one resulted
from ad hoc bargaining, for any given buyer the gure displays an array of
dierent transaction types.
A brief description, denitions and summary statistics of the variables
used in the analysis are provided in an appendix.
26Here, \red" refers to the bricks color, and \multi" to its non-uniform color shading.
27Figure 1 must be viewed in a color print.
28It is costly to run idle kilns, and it is costly to switch them on. Hence, a manufacturer operat-
ing with under-utilized capacity experiences a decline in bargaining power, while a manufacturer
operating at capacity is in a strong bargaining position.
29This was conrmed in discussions with the UK Brick Development Association.
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Figure 1: Price dispersion for a red multi brick; 3 national builders, 2004.
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3.2 Methodology and Results
The empirical methodology aims at uncovering the reduced form relationship
between brick price and various determinants of price. And it intends to test
the restrictions that the theoretical considerations outlined in the previous
section impose on the reduced form model specication. The specic focus
thereby is on the question whether buyers who have greater switching possi-
bilities benet from lower prices, on average; this is captured by the coecient
on the number of the buyer's local supply chains (Comp). The empirical anal-
ysis attempts to control for various characteristics of the transaction. First,
there may be volume eects when price schedules are potentially nonlinear;
these should be captured by the coecient on log transaction volume (col
Vol). Second, as in this industry transport costs are signicant, relative to
brick price, there may be distance eects: Buyers with construction or delivery
sites that are more distant to the manufacturer's plants may be incentivized
by discounts to capture their business; distance eects should be reected in
the coecient on distance between plant and delivery location (dist). Third,
the analysis controls for brick attributes: On average, extruded bricks are
cheaper than soft-mud bricks, and similarly engineering bricks are cheaper
than facing bricks30.
The data unfortunately do not permit to identify whether any given trans-
action is carried out subject to the terms of a framework agreement, or
whether it is an ad hoc deal. In light of the foregoing theoretical analysis,
transaction volume may be endogenous when not called o within a frame-
work agreement, while it may be treated as exogenous when the transaction
is governed by a framework agreement31. The analysis therefore, next to or-
dinary regressions, presents results obtained from instrumenting volume. As
argued earlier, in the case of ad hoc bargains, rm size is exogenous to the
deal, so rm size can act as instrument for volume.
The number of actual and potential supply chains is another potentially
endogenous regressor, to the extent that established supply chains are choice
30There are further, less sizeable categories such as attons and blues which make up the re-
mainder.
31Industry sources argued that brick type and transaction volume are typically dictated by the
construction design, and the cost of bricks is typically small relative to other construction costs
and hence not a consideration when buying bricks.
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outcomes on the part of the buyer. In this industry, where transport costs
are non-negligible, free transport arranged by the manufacturer acts as an
incentive scheme to reward loyalty on the part of buyers. The data record
whether the manufacturer arranges the transport of any given transaction.
In the absence of bundling32, a dummy indicating manufacturer arranged
delivery can act as instrument for the number of supply chains: Loyal buyers
stick to fewer suppliers and are rewarded for their loyalty by free ancillary
services such as delivery, and in the absence of bundling there is no correlation
between delivery arrangement and brick transaction price.
First stage regressions are reported in the appendix and conrm the an-
ticipated necessary correlations with the potentially endogenous regressors.
As is now increasingly recognized in applied demand analysis, heterogene-
ity across economic decision makers is an empirical regularity that should be
accounted for, if possible. In the present case, as argued earlier, this is the
case a fortiori due to the intrinsic unobservability of some of the bargaining
parties' outside option. Transaction panel data permit to control for manu-
facturer and buyer specic eects if they are present.
32This identifying assumption was corroborated by discussions with Competition Commission
sta and the UK Brick Development Association.
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Price per 1k Bricks
FE RE IV (1) IV (2) IV(3)
Supplier 2 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.244*** 0.784*** 0.424***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.014) (0.006)
Supplier 3 -0.089*** -0.090*** -0.012*** 0.195*** -0.036***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004)
Supplier 4 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.056*** 0.072*** 0.052***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004)
dist (km) 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.001*** -0.005*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Comp -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.167*** -0.600*** -0.304***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.002)
log Vol -0.213*** -0.213*** -0.219*** -0.238*** -0.080***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
week 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
facing -0.375*** -0.375*** -0.039*** 0.853*** 0.103***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.018) (0.004)
eng -0.457*** -0.457*** . 1.215*** .
(0.003) (0.003) . (0.026) .
cons 7.751*** 7.537*** 8.313*** 9.809*** 7.549***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.031) (0.017)
Table 3: Regression results; standard errors in parenthesis.
IV(1): Comp instrumented with buyer size.
IV(1): Comp instrumented with delivery dummy.
IV(1): Comp and log Volume instrumented with buyer size and delivery dummy.
? signicant at 10 percent level
?? signicant at 5 percent level
??? signicant at 1 percent level
Table 3 presents the estimation results from dierent estimation method-
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ologies.33 In light of the theoretical considerations stipulated in the previous
section, one would expect the coecients on log transaction volume (log Vol)
to be negative in the presence of nonlinear pricing, i.e. when manufacturers
have some degree of market power. Similarly, one would expect the coecient
on the number of competing suppliers (Comp) to be negative if buyers had
some degree of countervailing power. The rst two columns, comparing xed
and random eects estimators suggest that the random eects renement, i.e.
conditional independence of buyer idiosyncratic eects, is plausible; this is
also conrmed by a Hausman test. Both estimators provide statistically sig-
nicant evidence of nonlinear pricing and countervailing power, although the
latter appears to be economically relatively insignicant. On the basis of these
regressions, one might conclude that manufacturers enjoy relatively stronger
market power, as they are able to impose nonlinear prices and experience
relatively little resistance in the face of buyers with modest countervailing
power.
In light of the potential endogeneity of transaction volume and the number
of competing suppliers, one might worry about these estimates being biased.
In particular, buyers with stronger bargaining power would be expected ce-
teris paribus to get lower prices, i.e. they would be associated with lower
residuals in the price function. And buyers with stronger bargaining power
ceteris paribus can stick to fewer suppliers and hence may not feel a need to
play o competitors. Therefore, one might expect the number of competing
supply chains (Comp) and the regression residuals to be positively correlated.
As a consequence, this would imply that the coecient estimate on Comp
is likely biased upwards. Similarly, buyers with stronger bargaining power
are more valuable to the supplier because ceteris paribus they place larger or-
ders and generally buy more. Therefore, one might expect transaction volume
and the regression residuals to be negatively correlated, and consequently this
would induce the coecient estimate on log volume to be biased downwards.
The instrumental variable regressions IV(1)-(3) conrm these biases. IV(3),
instrumenting the number of competing suppliers by the delivery dummy and
log transaction volume by buyer size correct for these biases. The IV esti-
mates show that the degree of countervailing power is actually signicantly
33The various acronyms are: FE - xed eects panel data estimator; RE - random eects panel
data estimator; IV - instrumental variable panel data estimator.
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more pronounced than what xed and random eects estimates without in-
strumentation suggest, while the nonlinear pricing eect is economically less
signicant. The instrumentation strategy then draws a dierent picture: It
suggests that buyers enjoy countervailing power arising from local competi-
tion in supply and their ability to switch, and this leads to uniformly lower
price schedules that exhibit a relatively moderate degree of nonlinearity.
These ndings accord with the Competition Commission's conclusion that
\larger buyers do have a degree of buyer power, [...] based on the purchasing
of large volumes [...] and their ability to multi-source".34
It may be worth noting that these results appear statistically signicant
even though one might worry about heteroskedasticity in the residuals as a
consequence of various layers of unobserved heterogeneity. Nonetheless, the
estimates are highly signicant in the present application. A more rened
model for the variances and covariance would enhance the eciency of the
panel data estimation and the precision of the estimator and may be useful in
other applications that do not exhibit the same degree of identifying variation
as the present data.
4 Conclusions
This paper provides a comprehensive framework that derives reduced form
testable predictions in an empirical analysis of countervailing power that is
useful for practitioners, such as competition economists in antitrust authori-
ties. This framework encompasses the two main features of pricing schemes
in business-to-business relationships: nonlinear equilibrium price schedules
and bargaining over rents. Disentangling these two features is critical to the
empirical identication of buyer power. A theoretical model investigates the
principal determinants of optimal pricing schemes, with buyers' switching pos-
sibilities as the primary source of countervailing power. It forms the basis for
the delineation of testable predictions for reduced form price regressions as
they are typically carried out in antitrust investigations. The empirical part
of the analysis presents an illustration of the conceptual approach oered in
this paper, for the UK brick industry. It presents a reduced form methodol-
ogy to estimate the impact of buyers' switching possibilities on prices. This
34See Competition Commission, nal report on the Wienerberger / Baggeridge inquiry (2007).
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methodology is readily implementable on the basis of transaction data, as
they are requested routinely by antitrust authorities at the outset of their
inquiries. The paper emphasizes the importance to control for endogeneity
of volumes and competing supply chains, and for heterogeneity across buyers
and suppliers.
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A Existence of Dual-Sourcing Equilibria
Consider equation (1). A dual-sourcing equilibrium requires that, for the op-
timal values of 1 and 2, 1 and 2 be positive. The more elastic the
suppliers' price schedules are relative to the buyer's revenue function, i.e. the
higher  , the more protable dual-sourcing will be
35. Similarly, the more fa-
vorable the suppliers' outside options, i.e. the smaller maxf1; 2g, the more
the buyer benets from dual-sourcing. The following result establishes that,
under adverse circumstances for the buyer, facing suppliers with suciently
favorable outside options, there exist ratios  that induce dual-sourcing equi-
libria.
Consider the following additional Assumption:
A4: maxf1; 2g <  := exp(1) 1exp(1) .
35Of course, if  is very high, then production will no longer be protable, so that a trivial
no-trade equilibrium arises.
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Lemma 1: Under assumptions A1', A2",A3" and A4, a dual-sourcing
equilibrium exist.
Proof: It follows from equation (1) that the prot from dual-sourcing is
rising in  , while the prot from single-sourcing is falling as

 increases,
with the minimum occurring at  = 1 + exp(1). The value of  that equates

(1 )( ) =
1
(1 )(= 1) at

 = 1 + exp(1) with 1 is
 = exp(1) 1exp(1) . So
minf1;2g > 0 provided maxf1; 2g <  and (1+)

 
(1+2)

 
 1.
Suppose 1 = 2 =  were a dual-sourcing equilibrium. Then,
(1+)
(1+2)
=
2
2  2 1 > 1. Hence, if both suppliers had equal outside options, then
a dual-sourcing equilibrium exists. Now consider a slight improvement of
supplier 1's outside option, say. This will slightly reduce the buyer's gain from
dual-sourcing, or equivalently reduce the Shapley value accruing to supplier 1.
Similarly, a slight deterioration of supplier 2's outside option, say, will slightly
improve the gain from dual sourcing. Since i, i = 1; 2, is continuous in j ,
j = 1; 2, the necessary inequality for the existence of dual-sourcing equilibria
is preserved. 
B Data and Auxiliary Regressions
The data is transaction level panel data. It comprises roughly six hundred
thousand individual transactions between UK buyers and the (three) manufac-
turers used in the analysis over the period 2001 - 2006. The unit of observation
is a transaction between a buyer and a manufacturer of a specic brick type
(product code), for which - next to identity of buyer, seller and brick type
- total transaction payment (net of transport costs and incentive payments),
transaction volume, date, delivery location, distance between manufacturing
site and delivery location, brick characteristics and logistic information are
recorded. Since typically for the majority of popular bricks, a given buyer
is associated with several transactions involving that brick over the obser-
vational horizon, the way in which the panel data structure is exploited in
this analysis is that the cross-sectional, idiosyncratic unit of observation is a
specic buyer, and the associated second dimensional unit is a specic brick,
with supplier dummies to identify the counterparty in the transaction.
Prices per one thousand bricks are in GBP. Volume is measured in num-
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ber of bricks. Distance is measured in kilometers between the manufacturing
plant and the construction or delivery site. To capture the buyers' switching
possibilities, the competition variable Comp records the number of competing
manufacturing plants in the buyer's supply chains that produce bricks of a
given type in a circle with 50km radius around the delivery site. Brick char-
acteristics include whether the bricks of the respective transaction are of the
extruded (as opposed to soft mud) variety, and whether they are engineering
(as opposed to facing) bricks. The data also record whether the delivery was
arranged by the manufacturer, or whether the bricks were collected by the
buyer. The associated delivery dummy is one of the two instruments used.
Buyer size Bsize, measured in terms of total number of bricks purchased per
scal year, is the second instrument.
The following table provides summary statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Price per 1k 637015 344.802 5093.57 0.0008306 3097000
Volume 637015 5991.746 3910.012 2 264000
sourcing 637015 2.567056 1.325533 1 4
distance (km) 581112 4.089677 17.90908 0 341.3
extruded 637015 .6811441 .4660334 0 1
engineering 637015 .0723782 .2591133 0 1
delivery 637015 0.58792 .4922097 0 1
Bsize 2224914 2.35e+08 2.89e+08 0 8.05e+08
Comp 1698466 4.236443 4.157144 0 19
Table B1: Summary statistics.
Table B2 presents the rst stage regression for the IV/2SLS estimation
results presented in Table 3.
34
Comp Vol
Supplier 2 1.368*** -0.557***
(0.016) (0.008)
Supplier 3 0.457*** 0.810***
(0.011) (0.006)
Supplier 4 0.076*** 0.116***
(0.011) (0.005)
distance (km) -0.009*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
week -0.000* 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
facing 1.989*** 0.774***
(0.011) (0.005)
eng 2.601*** 2.502***
(0.019) (0.008)
Bsize -0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
delivery -0.541*** 0.906***
(0.007) (0.004)
const 4.155*** 5.693***
(0.042) (0.016)
Table B2: First stage regression results; standard errors in parenthesis.
? signicant at 10 percent level
?? signicant at 5 percent level
??? signicant at 1 percent level
The four UK brick suppliers have dierent capacities. Suppliers 1 has 7
plants and supplier 2 has 20 plants. Supplier 3 is the largest supplier, with 23
plants and the largest geographic spread.36 For the three suppliers included
in the analysis, supplier 1 produced an average of 87.3 million bricks per year,
supplier 2 195.2 million and supplier 3 353.7 million bricks per year.
36This information is sourced from the Provisional Findings report of the Competition Commis-
sion.
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